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INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes thought that the police power belongs with the
history of constitutional and administrative law. Section I of my
contribution to this Symposium on Contemporary Issues of Administrative
Law shows that that impression is partly correct. As I explore the historical
background of the police power, I invite the reader to join me in an
excursion into the past indeed. Pufendorf, Blackstone, Vattel, and other
fairly old-fashioned authors, deal with “police” in ways that prefigure the
police power of the states in America.1 Nevertheless, the police power is
ever present, under different names, in contemporary jurisprudence; the
current coronavirus pandemic is unquestionably providing strong regulatory
* Professor of Law, Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina; Independent
Researcher, National Council for the Research in the Humanities (CONICET);
Visiting Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School (Indiana) and
Strathmore University Law School (Kenya). The author wishes to thank the
Canterbury Institute in Oxford for hosting him while preparing this article and
Dominic Burbidge, Elisabetta Fiocchi, Basilio Hernandez, Patrick Howes,
Florencia Ivanissevich, Malcolm Kibati, Maryanne Kiilur, Brian Lapsa, Esteban
Leccese, Ivy Mabelle, Jim Mirabal, Maryanne Ngina, Mane Recabarren Valdes
(jr), Jentrix Wanjama, and Paul Yowell.
1. See infra Section I.
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powers an opportunity to shine again in the legal firmament. Section II
starts by underlining how “police” landed in the nascent United States,
where it became known as “police power,” courtesy of an ever-creative
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall. This section also tracks the
evolution of the police power in United States case law, distinguishing a
broad from a narrow conception of police power and pointing out how the
police power also received other names, such as “power of regulation” or
“regulatory power.” Section III of this article explains the ways in which
the police power plays a significant role in international law, in particular in
what has to do with foreign investment. The distinction between
expropriation (including indirect takings) and non-compensable regulatory
measures has been clearly accepted in bilateral investment treaties as well
as in other sources of international law. Section IV of this Article explores
the moral dimension of the police power, with particular focus on the law of
overruling necessity, both as a principle concerning the dispensation of
rules and as a principle concerning the restriction of rights. Two examples
are examined in some detail. The first, coming from Argentina (the author’s
country of origin), involves the exceptional dispensation of the principle of
separation of powers – a constitutional rule in Argentina, as well as in other
countries, including of course the United States. The second, coming from
the U.S., involves the restriction of property rights during emergencies,
tracking the economic crisis around the great depression of 1930. Section V
of this Article emphasizes the importance of having tools that help readers
of this Article understand the legal aspects of the present Covid crisis,
concluding that the history of the police power and its moral dimensions are
of crucial importance with a view to understanding the present.
I. BIOGRAPHICAL ROOTS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
I hope that you will forgive me if I start looking backwards into my
own life as I share with you how I came across the police power and how I
got to work on it, on and off, for the last twenty years. In 1998, I started to
write a dissertation in Oxford under Professor John Finnis, the famous
natural law thinker and a fellow of University College, Oxford.2 My initial
interest was in the topic of “public morality,” but he suggested that it would
be fruitful if instead of researching that topic as such I would first look into
the police power. Finnis explained to me that he was optimistic that I would
find interesting materials and theories on public morality under the police
2. John Finnis taught law and legal philosophy in Oxford from 1966 until
2010, when he retired from his Oxford chair. From 1995 he also taught at the
University of Notre Dame Law School, in Indiana, until he retired from his Notre
Dame chair in 2020.
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power heading, as classically “public morality” was one of several goods
pursued by the police power.
I started reading in chronological order the authors Finnis
recommended to me. I first read Samuel Pufendorf’s De Iure Naturae et
Gentium.3 Even though the German author never used the terms “police” or
“police power” in his magnum opus published halfway through the
seventeenth century, Pufendorf sowed the seeds of the concept of “police” –
the terminological predecessor of the “police power.” 4 His strategy was to
tie what would shortly afterwards be called by other European writers of the
eighteenth century “police” (and by the Americans a bit later “police
power”) to the idea of “transcendental propriety” (what the Americans
would call “eminent domain” and “takings,” treating it usually hand-inhand with “police power”). Pufendorf considered the problem of police (I
insist, without using that term) when he analyzed the extent of “the Nature
of the Supreme Power of the Sovereign.”5 Such power, he intimated, may
be reduced to three heads. First, there is a general power to make laws for
the common good; second, there is the taxation power; third, “the Exercise
of the Transcendental Propriety.”6
Although, as I said, Pufendorf never uses the term “police” in his
1672 book, the examples he offers of the “first head” include exactly the
same kinds of laws that would be later called by Vattel and Blackstone
“police regulations”. These police regulations include laws against
gambling, idleness, and prodigality, among others. More relevant for our
discussion here, the first head also includes economic regulations such as
“Laws that forbid certain Subjects to possess certain Kinds of Goods.”7 It is
worth noting that Pufendorf includes too within “the Supreme Power of the
Sovereign” regulations concerning what was later called “eminent
domain.”8 As already hinted, this strategy was closely followed in due time
by American commentators. When dealing with what he called “the power
3. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS
827 (Oxford 1710).
4. The tools of our trade, as academics, are propositions and meanings,
statements and words. It is important to get it clear about these! For example, when
dealing with police and police power it is important to keep in mind the distinction
between terms and concepts. Even in the absence of the term, the concept may still
be there. Cristobal Orrego, Natural Law Under Other Names: De Nominibus Non
Est Disputandum, 52 AM. J. JURIS 77, 83 (2007).
5. PUFENDORF, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 826.
8. See Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9
U. of PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 755–57 (2007) (Discussing Pufendorf’s strategy of
tacking together eminent domain and police power).
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of regulation” (what shortly after would become “the police power”) James
Kent – one of the first constitutional scholars of the United States – cited
expressly to Pufendorf’s discussion on transcendental propriety.9
The second author I read was Sir William Blackstone. Finnis was
right again: under the name “police,” the Commentaries on the Laws of
England, written between 1765 and 1769, featured the police power and
public morality in the context of so-called “crimes against the police”.10 He
talks of “polity” and “police” twice: first in Book I of the Commentaries
while dealing with the prerogative of the king, and later in Book IV when
he refers to public wrongs. In Book IV, when dealing with the crimes and
misdemeanors “that more especially affect the common-wealth,”
Blackstone points out that they may be subdivided into five species:
“offences against public justice, against the public peace, against public
trade, against the public health, and against the public police or
economy.”11 By “the public police and economy” Blackstone means “the
due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and
good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their
respective stations.”12 Blackstone’s term “public police” landed in the U.S.
shortly after he coined it and there it became “the police power.”13
Thirdly, I turned to Emer de Vattel, a name that twenty years ago
sounded vaguely familiar to me but has since become one of those authors I
always return to. Again, Finnis was spot on: Le Droit des Gens proved to be
a gold mine for my dissertation.14 Vattel considered that to procure the true

9. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 (G. F.
Comstock, Little, Brown, and Company 1866) (11th ed.1866) (citing Pufendof
when dealing with the power of regulation).
10. 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 128 (University of
Chicago Press 1979).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 162.
13. Blackstone's ideas, and through him those of Pufendorf and other
enlightened European thinkers, had more impact in the United States than in his
own country. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American
Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 737 (1976)
(noting that the Commentaries was an instant best seller in the United States).
14. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS
(J. Newbery et al. trans., 1759). For the history of Vattel’s book and a complete
assessment of his contribution see ELISABETTA FIOCCHI MALASPINA, L’ ETERNO
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felicity of the nation is one of the principal objects of a good government. 15
He called this object of government “police” (in French) sometimes
translated in English as “polity” sometimes as “police.”16 At any rate, these
two words are cognates and were used interchangeably in the eighteenth
century. Vattel elaborates on the term ‘“police” by giving various examples
of regulations, some of them in the context of the limits of private property,
along the lines of Pufendorf. I will offer a lengthy quotation as it is
enlightening in retrospect, with the current rise of the police power in the
light of the pandemic in the twenty-first century:
It must also be observed that individuals are not free in the
economy or government of their affairs as not to be subject
to the regulations of polity made by the sovereign. For
instance, if vines are greatly multiplied in a country, which
is in want of corn, the sovereign may forbid the planting of
the vine in fields proper for tillage, for here the public
welfare and the safety of the state are concerned. [...] When
a reason of such importance requires it, the sovereign, or
the magistrate, may oblige an individual to sell all the
provisions that are more than sufficient for the subsistence
of his family, and fix the price. The public authority may
and ought to hinder monopolies, and suppress all practices
tending to raise the price of provisions […].17
The Swiss master of international law was elaborating here – in this
general section of Le Droit des Gens, which precedes the treatment of
international law – along regulatory lines similar to those of Pufendorf one
hundred years earlier, when the German writer had referred to the “first
head” of government.
RITORNO DEL DROIT DES GENS DI EMER DI VATTEL XVIII-XIX (Max Planck
Institute for European Legal History, Frankfurt am Main, 2017).
15. VATTEL, supra note 14, at 21.
16. See id. (translating “police” as “polity”); see also THE LAW OF NATIONS
OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS
OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 141 (Luke White trans. 1792) (using the term
‘polity’ for the French police); id. at 83 (Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J. W. Johnson,
Law Booksellers 1834) (using ‘internal police’ instead of ‘polity’ and ‘regulations
of police’ instead of ‘regulations of polity’).
17. VATTEL, supra note 14, at 115 n. 255, emphasis added. Compare Joseph
Chitty trans., T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1834 (“It must also be observed
that individuals are not so perfectly free in the economy or government of their
affairs, as not to be subject to the laws and regulations of police made by the
sovereign . . . .”).
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Vattel’s book “made a profound impression upon the mind of the
time; and especially, upon the mind of America.”18 His writings on
regulatory powers (under the name of “police” or “polity”) have been
enormously influential, especially in the United States.19
Professor Finnis also mentioned Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui as an
author I should have consulted for my topic, but I was so overwhelmed with
the other three, and with the vast American literature of the nineteenth
century on the police power, that I confess I never got around reading
carefully the other “Swiss star” of the eighteenth century.20 Mea culpa! A
cursory glance at his Principes du Droit Naturel (1747), however, showed
me even then that, although the usual police-related topics are to be found
in Burlamaqui’s book in one form or another, their articulation by the Swiss
writer is less clear than in Pufendorf, Blackstone, and Vattel.
II. RISE OF THE POLICE POWER
The European invention of the term ‘police’ had its counterpart in
the United States: the police power. In a series of seminal, early nineteenthcentury cases, Chief Justice Marshall successfully coined the term “police
power” to refer to what earlier had been called “police.”21 In effect, the
“combined phrase,” as the latter has been called in an extraordinary essay
by Hastings,22 is nothing but a different name for the old idea of police.23
18. 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 147 (The University of Chicago Press 1953).
19. Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM POLIT. SCI. REV. 395
(1913); The Authority of Vattel, II (1914) 8 AM POLIT. SCI. REV. 375.
20. See Peter Korkman, Burlamaqui and Natural Law, OLL (Liberty fund,
2006) https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/burlamaqui-and-natural-law.
21. Like many other important phrases of American constitutional law, the
term “police power” was introduced by Chief Justice John Marshall. This occurred
in 1827 in the famous case Brown v. Maryland 25 U.S. 419 (1827), but the idea
had already been raised by him in earlier cases, and for this reason it has been said
to have come to him by degrees. W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as
Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State, AM. PHIL.
SOC. 163, 365–66 (1900).
22. W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions
Relating to the Police Power of the State, AM. PHIL. SOC. 163, 359 (1900).
23. Walter W. Cook saw this clearly in a short but significant article published
in 1907: “Is there any connection between the two phrases? I believe that there is,
and that a study of the subsequent history will show that the one was substituted for
the other, and that the more modern phrase, "the police power," is to-day used by
our courts in much the same sense that the earlier phrase ["internal police"] was
used in the convention by the framers of the constitution.” Walter W. Cook, What
is the Police Power 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 326 (1907).
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This is confirmed by judicial decisions that talk alternatively of police and
police power to refer to the same thing.24
Since Chief Justice Marshall coined the term “police power,” it has
never stopped being used by the Supreme Court and by constitutional
scholars.25 Even when in recent times expressions such as “power of
regulation” or “regulatory powers” have tended to substitute “police power”
(especially in economic contexts, such as the ones I alluded to in the
preceding section when dealing with Pufendorf, Blackstone, and Vattel),26
the truth is, as William J. Novak has put it, “the substantive roots of state
regulatory power [are found] in early modern notions of police.”27
During the so-called Lochner era, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, police regulations concerning welfare were regularly struck down
as unconstitutional.28 It was a time in which a narrow understanding of the
police power prevailed.29 Under this narrow meaning, the police power
designated a particular branch of state legislative authority, namely the one
24. Legarre, supra note 8, at 784–85.
25. Under different names (including “regulatory power”), the police power
has been and still is a bedrock not only of Constitutional but also of Administrative
Law.
26. See infra Section III (illustrating the use of the terms “regulatory powers”
and “power of regulation” to refer to police powers in international law).
27. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 13 (University of North Carolina Press 1996).
28. During the Lochner era, “if the Court believed the regulation was truly
designed to protect the health, safety, or morals of the general public, it was apt to
uphold the law. But if the Court perceived the law to be an effort to readjust the
market in favor of one party to the contract, it was more likely to hold the
regulation invalid.” GEOFFREY R. STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 757 (3rd ed.
1996).
29. Earlier formulations of the broad concept of police power, in terms of
"internal police," include Justice Barbour's oft-quoted dictum in Mayor of New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 103 (1837), that "[a]ll those powers which relate to
merely municipal legislation, or which may more properly be called internal police,
are not surrendered or restrained; and, consequently, in relation to these, the
authority of a state is complete, unqualified and exclusive." Also in Miln, Justice
Thompson posed the following rhetorical question: "Can anything fall more
directly within the police power and internal regulation of a state, than that which
concerns the care and management of paupers or convicts,.. ?" Id. at 148
(Thompson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Proprietors of Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 552 (1837) ("We cannot deal
thus with the rights reserved to the states; and by legal intendments and mere
technical reasoning, take away from them any portion of that power over their own
internal police and improvement, which is so necessary to their wellbeing and
prosperity.").
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aimed at promoting public health, public safety, and public morality.30
Public welfare, on the other hand, was considered outside of the scope of
the police power. For purposes of this restriction, the Court used a
substantive interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.31 As one commentator put it, the doctrine
of economic substantive due process “represented a significant attempt to
limit the scope of the police power.”32 Although it must be acknowledged
that some rather exceptional cases of this period considered “general
welfare” or “general prosperity” as legitimate police power ends.33
At any rate, it is clear that after the demise of the Lochner era in the
mid-1930’s, the police power grew to encompass more than just the
promotion of public morals, health, and safety. In 1934, the Supreme Court
approved Minnesota’s mortgage emergency regulations34 and upheld New
York’s milk pricing.35 Both statutes were deemed to be valid exercises of
the police power of the states (and we shall revisit them in section III in the
light of the law of overruling necessity). The Lochner era came to an end
when, in 1937, the Court reversed itself and upheld minimum wage
legislation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.36 From this point onwards, the
Court rejected the Lochner-ian reading of the Due Process Clause and
began to regularly uphold regulations in the economic field. This entailed
an expansion of the police power. Now there was no doubt that general
welfare, including economic and social interests, was within its permissible
scope. In the words of a 1952 decision, “the police power is not confined to
a narrow category; it extends to all the great public needs.”37
It was therefore evident after the demise of Lochner that economic
interests were within the legitimate scope of the police power, under the
label of either public welfare or public prosperity, and this remains the case
today.
30. 3 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1766 (Baker, Voorhis, & Co., 2nd ed. 1929).
31. Id. at 1770.
32. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 471, 488 (2004).
33. Professor Tribe stresses that, contrary to widespread belief, it is not true
that the Lochner Court struck down every single instance of the police power in
economic and social matters. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 1318 (Foundation Press 2000).
34. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
35. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
36. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37. Day-Brite v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952) (upholding a conviction
under a Missouri statute forbidding employers from docking the wages of
employees who have absented them- selves in order to vote).

2021]

THE ENDURING LEGACY OF THE POLICE POWER

417

III. THE POLICE POWER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
We have seen that the police power is an established category of
American Constitutional Law. The laws of other nations, which followed
those of the United States, also have incorporated the concept of the police
power.38 I will now show that in recent times the police power of the states
has also been recognized by international law.
Let us begin by sharing the view of Professor Sornarajah, a
respected international law scholar: “the fact that there could be an
interference with the use of property by the state for the common good of
society is well recognized in modern systems of law.”39 The development
of international investment brought, together with progressive bonds
between the several countries, considerable legal problems. Some of these
have been addressed by Bilateral Investment Treaties (known as BITs).40
To illustrate my point about the police power in international law, I will
take the example of the BIT between Argentina and the United States –
whose application is for the most part in the hands of the arbitral tribunals
that act under the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).
The following is the most relevant provision of the BIT between
Argentina and the United States:
Article XI, BIT Argentina–US
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security
interests.41
Vattel’s police, Kent’s power of regulation and, ultimately, the
acceptance of the police power by conventional international law are all
38. Argentina, my own country, has incorporated both the concept and the
term poder de policia, Spanish for “police power.” This is unsurprising as
Argentina drew inspiration from the American Constitution when drafting its own
constitution.
39. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
298 (Cambridge University Press 1994).
40. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
41 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 469 (2000).
41. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
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recognized in this provision of the BIT between Argentina and the United
States. This acceptance normally goes hand-in-hand with the international
recognition of another domestic power akin to the police power: the power
of eminent domain, which brings to our memory Pufendorf’s strategy of
tacking these two powers together, discussed in section I above.42
The difference between eminent domain and police power, in
international law, lies in the required payment of compensation in the
former, which is absent in the latter: when a regulation is considered to fall
within the police power no compensation is due. In Céline Lévesque’s
words: “by virtue of international law, the foreigner injured by a taking has
a right to compensation, in the absence of which the expropriation is illegal.
On the contrary, a regulation does not confer a right to compensation.”43
We ought to keep in mind, in the light of the discussion in the two
preceding sections, that “regulation” (in the French original
“réglementation”) is equivalent to “police power.”
Likewise, Jason L. Gudofsky stated:
The police power represents the major exception to the
requirement that property owners be compensated for their
expropriated property. This exception, which is recognized
under both international and municipal law, serves as the
fundamental means by which a government can implement
necessary programs in pursuit of safety, health, welfare,
comfort and morals without being consequently held liable
to compensate property owners whose property has been
negatively impacted as a result of such measures.44
It follows from this quotation that international law has emulated
municipal, domestic law in elaborating the relevant distinction between
expropriation and police power.
Some international arbitral tribunals have dug deeper to try to find
the dividing line between expropriation and police power. An
UNCITRAL/NAFTA Tribunal, for example, held in Methanex Corporation
v. United States of America:

42. PUFENDORF, supra note 3.
43. Céline Lévesque, Les Fondements de la Distinction entre l’ Expropriation
et la Réglementation en Droit International, 33 REVUE GÉNÉRAL DE DROIT 41
(2003).
44. Jason L. Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental
Case Study, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 243, 287 (2000) (emphasis added).
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The key dividing line between a taking and a police power
regulation […] lies in whether or not there was in effect an
expropriation. […][An] expropriation […] does not occur if
[...] the regulatory action has not deprived the Claimant of
control of his company, [...] interfered directly in the
internal operations [...] or displaced the Claimant as the
controlling shareholder.45
Furthermore, in the same case the NAFTA Tribunal provided a careful
characterization of the police power:
[...] as a matter of general international law, a nondiscriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is
enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects,
inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed
expropriatory
and
compensable
unless
specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government
to the then putative foreign investor contemplating
investment that the government would refrain from such
regulation.46
This characterization led ultimately to the rejection of Methanex’s claim for
compensation for “no such commitments were given to Methanex.”47
Hence the concluding words of the arbitral tribunal: “From the standpoint
of international law, the California ban was a lawful regulation and not an
expropriation.”48
Going back to domestic (or municipal) law and instantiating that
law again with the paradigmatic example of the United States, we shall see
that the same distinction between the compensable and the noncompensable applies there. As recalled by Madeline Stone, the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law addresses this problem.49 Section 712 of the
45. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL
Arbitration/ NAFTA 281 (2005).
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 281.
49. Madeline Stone, NAFTA Article 1110: Environmental Friend or Foe? 15
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 763, 770 (2003). Stone recalls: “As in the spheres of
domestic contracts and tort law, the American Law Institute writes and updates a
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which is compiled by American scholars on
international law. The Restatement, though an unofficial document, represents the
current state of inter- national law as understood by these leading international law
scholars.”
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Restatement, titled “State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Nationals
of Other States,” refers directly to the conditions of and States’
responsibilities for expropriation under international law.50 Like Article
1110 of NAFTA,51 section 712 sets three criteria as the baseline for a legal
activity of a State:
A state is responsible under international law for injury
resulting from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of a
national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose,
or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by
provision for just compensation [...].52
Stone next explains: “As with other Restatements, much of the substance of
section 712 is revealed in the comments and notes that follow the
provisions.”53 According to Comment g, section 712(1) applies to direct
expropriations and to other actions of the government that have the effect of
taking the property, in whole or in large part, outright or in stages.54 In other
words, both direct and indirect expropriations are compensable. On the
other hand, the Restatement distinguishes a category of activities that, while
arguably falling under section 712(1), are not compensable:
A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police
power of states, if it is not discriminatory [...] and is not
designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the
state or sell it at a distress price.55
Both the word “regulation” and the term “police power” feature
prominently in this succinct and accurate description of the noncompensable or, in the words of the Restatement, that for which “a state is
not responsible.”
Let us finish this section with the words of Brower and Steven that
aptly sum up this topic of expropriation versus police power in international
law: “it is a difficult task to draw the line between a taking and a regulation,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Gudofsky, supra note 44, at 243.
Stone, supra note 49, at 770.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 771.
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and international law has not fully articulated all the relevant criteria [...]
[but] this is equally true under domestic law.”56 These scholars summed up
this time while responding in anticipation to a much foreseeable concern.
IV. THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY AND THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF THE POLICE POWER
The concept of police power preexisted the invention of the term
police power and the use of the term in domestic and international law. It is
a moral concept and is always valid under different names.57
According to William J. Novak, the law of the police power may be
summarized in the following four principles: sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas; salus populi suprema lex est; ubi necessitas; and parens patriae.58
All four are very important, but in this section, I will focus especially on ubi
necessitas, as it is arguably the cornerstone of the police power, both in the
common law and in the civil law worlds.
All four principles were originally Roman Law maxims, later
adopted by the Common Law.59 The principles, however, preexisted any
Civil Law or Common Law recognition, as they are moral principles,
(morally) valid with independence of any legal positing. They are an
instance of what Thomas Aquinas called a derivation of positive law from
natural law by way of conclusion.60 This type of derivation is one of two
possible ways in which a certain legal principle or rule is connected with
the permanent principles of practical reasonableness – the latter expression
being another term for what the classics called “natural law.”61
The vast majority of legal, positive rules are derived from those
permanent principles “by way of determination,”62 where the connection
between the legal rule and the moral rule is less visible and more remote
56. Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, NAFTA Chapter 11: Who Then
Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter
11, 2 CHIC. J. INT’L. L. 193, 200 (2001).
57. The same is true, for example, about “natural law.” I refer again the reader
to Cristobal Orrego, Natural Law Under Other Names: De Nominibus Non-Est
Disputandum, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 77 (2007).
58. William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in
America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1091–95 (1994).
59. Id. at 1091.
60. THOMAS AQUINAS, Whether Every Human Law Is Derived From the
Natural Law?, in SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II q. 95, art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1915) (1485).
61. Santiago Legarre, A New Natural Law Reading of the Constitution, 78 LA.
L. REV. 877, 885–92 (2018) (explaining in detail what natural law is).
62. AQUINAS, supra note 60.
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than in derivation by way of conclusion. In derivation by way of
determination, the human legislator specifies a certain, general, moral
principle in one of several possible ways. In other words, the legislator
determines the right option out of a broad menu of more or less equally
reasonable alternatives – reasonable a priori insofar as they would all be
conducive to the promotion of the general, moral principle in question: the
moral principle being determined by the determinatio.63 On the other hand,
some positive rules and principles, such as ubi necessitas, are connected
straightforwardly with natural, moral law. When the human legislator
enacts them into positive law it is for the most part ratifying legally what
was already required morally (as right or wrong).64 In these cases, the legal
rule is endorsing (legally) a preexisting moral rule and, ordinarily,
accompanying it with previously non-existing sanctions. In a relevant way,
one can speak in this situation of the coexistence of two normative orders,
one natural and one positive, which is not to say that both orders are exactly
the same or that they have the same goals.65
Let us explain the legal principle known as “the law of overruling
necessity”66 – one of the four maxims alluded to in this article by its Latin
name: ubi necessitas – in the light of the more general scheme of derivation
by way of conclusion. The principle has two formulations or subprinciples:
ubi necessitas cessat lex and ubi necessitas cessat ius. The literal translation
from Latin of “ubi necessitas cessat lex” is “in case of necessity the law
ceases to exist” and of “ubi necessitas cessat ius,” “in case of necessity the
right ceases to exist.” Sometimes the classics just put both simply as
“necessity knows no law” (“necessitas legem non habet”).67
The law of overruling necessity is applied and ought to be applied
everywhere and always; its intrinsic reasonableness makes it a derivation
from natural law by way of conclusion. During emergencies, however, the
application of the law of overruling necessity becomes more prominent as
in emergency situations “necessity” arises in an unexpected and pervasive
way. This is very clear when it comes to physical emergencies such as
floods, tsunamis, and earthquakes. In some parts of the world (such as my

63. Santiago Legarre, Derivation of Positive from Natural Law Revisited, 57
AM. J. JURIS. 103, 104–06 (2012) (providing examples of determinatio and
contrasting them with examples of derivation by way of conclusion).
64. Legarre, supra note 61, at 889–91.
65. John Finnis, Coexisting Normative Orders? Yes, but No, 57 AM. J. JURIS.
111, 117 (2012) (arguing that while natural law is an incomplete normative order
positive law presents itself as complete).
66. Novak, supra note 58, at 1092.
67. JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 260 n.30
(1998).
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own country, Argentina), emergency situations may more commonly result
from deep economic crises (always pervasive, sometimes more unexpected
than others). I shall offer one such example from Argentina. My other
example of an economic emergency will be a historical one which arose in
the United States. Even though in recent decades the law of overruling
necessity has (luckily!) not manifested itself in the economic realm in North
America, the current, 2020 coronavirus pandemic alerts us to the regrettable
possibility that the not-so-good old times may revisit us soon.
In Argentina (but the same is true of the United States and of many
other countries), the law of overruling necessity has been applied in a
remarkable way to issues of separation of powers.68 This is an instance of
the Argentine legal system making room for the first manifestation or
subprinciple of the law of overruling necessity (ubi necessitas cessat lex),
because under an emergency, a certain rule (in Latin, lex) may “cease” to
exist. I italicize “cease” to stress that what happens under the necessity
principle is not so much that the rule ceases to exist, but rather that the rule
(e.g. separation of powers) seems less stringent than in normal
circumstances. The best example of this situation in Argentine
constitutional practice is the Peralta case, which arose in the context of one
of the biggest economic crises in Argentine history. The facts were as
follows.69
In July 1989, Argentina was suffering from a huge inflationary
process, so called hyper-inflation.70 At the same time, the exchange rate
was fluctuating wildly with the dollar increasing its worth every day and the
Austral – the national currency at that time – tending to lose all its buying
power.71 Then-President Carlos Menem had inherited this situation from his
predecessor, Raúl Alfonsín, who had ended his term before completion in
the midst of social chaos and violence, enhanced by the economic crisis.72
68. By way of contrast, in the United States the principle of necessity does not
extend, as a matter of principle, to issues of separation of powers. Nevertheless, for
possible exceptions in which there appears to be a flexible interpretation of the
separation of powers in the presence of an emergency, see Youngstown Tube &
Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981).
69. On the general background of the Peralta case, and more generally, on
emergencies in Argentina and the way they impact jurisprudential thought, see Jose
Sebastian Elias, Legal Reasoning In Developing Countries: The Case Of
Argentina, THE 2005 ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS ASSOCIATION 95 (Max Leskiewicz ed., 2006).
70. Paul Beckerman, Central-Bank 'Distress' and Hyperinflation in Argentina,
1989–90, 27 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 663, 663 (1995).
71. Id. at 672–73.
72. Id. at 663.

424

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 409

In a dramatic context, as soon as he took office, Menem managed to get
congressional approval of laws 23.696 and 23.697, which declared the
country in a state of “economic emergency” and at the same time
implemented several measures designed to deal with the situation.73 A few
months later, in January 1990, another piece was added to the new
economic policy: a presidential decree or executive order (number 36/90)
which turned most bank deposits of over one million Australes
(approximately $600 U.S. dollars) into long-term government bonds.74 Mr.
Peralta was one of hundreds of thousands of Argentines who were impeded
by decree 36/90 to take their money from their bank accounts. Instead, he
was given government bonds called “Bonex.” Since his bank was forced to
do this by a presidential decree, Mr. Peralta sued the government (instead of
suing his bank who had no alternative but to comply with the law).75 The
case eventually reached the Supreme Court.76
In its nearly unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court, in order to
justify Menem’s executive order, offered a flexible interpretation of the
separation of powers principle included in the Argentine constitution.77
According to the Court, the relaxation of the separation of powers
principles was justified by the subprinciple of necessity ubi necessitas
cessat lex.78 Under that principle, and in the face of an evident emergency
like the one in question, one ought not to have adhered strictly to the idea
that it was for Congress to regulate bank deposits. On the contrary, swift
action by the Executive with a view to preserve the integrity of the Nation
was of paramount importance and allowed for the aforementioned flexible
interpretation of the distribution of competencies between the Legislative
and the Executive branches of government. The Court was pointing here
implicitly to another police power maxim: salus populi suprema lex est (the
health of the nation is the supreme law of the land)79, as it is clear from the
73. Juliana Bambaci et al., The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in
Argentina, J. POL’Y REFORM 75, 80 (2002).
74. Presidential Decree No. 36/90, Jan. 30, 1990, 2 E.D.L.A. 11 (1990)
(Arg.); see also Horacio Spector, Don’t Cry for me Argentina: Economic Crises
and the Restructuring of Financial Property, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 771,
783 (2009).
75. See generally Manuel José J. García-Mansilla, Separation of Powers
Crisis: The Case of Argentina, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 353 (2004)
(describing President Menem’s attempts to quell hyperinflation).
76. On the Peralta case, and related emergency matters, see García-Mansilla,
supra note 75; see also Spector, supra note 74, at 783–84.
77. Spector, supra note 74, at 783–84.
78. Id. at 783.
79. In the maxim, salus populi suprema lex est, “salus” means literally
“health” but metaphorically “salvation” or “survival” (of the people or nation).
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reasoning that for the Court, the argument of necessity was reinforced by
the argument of the survival of the nation.80
The interpretation in the Peralta case eventually led to a
Constitutional amendment in 1994, incorporating a more flexible system of
separation of powers, as the amendment provided expressly for the
possibility of executive orders on legislative matters during emergencies.81
Although the amendment was intended to provide some sort of positive
recognition to the legislative powers of the Executive during emergencies,
with a view to their moderation, the truth is that since 1994 the instances in
which the Executive has legislated have multiplied exponentially.82
As a matter of historical, constitutional practice in the United
States, the law of overruling necessity has been outstandingly applied to
restrict property rights. This is an instance in the U.S. legal system of the
second manifestation or subprinciple of the law of overruling necessity: ubi
necessitas cessat ius, because under emergencies rights “cease” to exist. I
italicize “cease” to stress that what happens under the necessity principle is
not really that the right is annihilated, but rather that the right (e.g. property)
is more severely constrained in an emergency than in normal
circumstances.
The main historical example of the restriction of property rights
during an economic emergency in the U.S. is the regulatory scheme that
followed the great depression of 1930 (though in part the regulations that
preceded the crisis, especially at the state level, were similarly instances of

80. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], Dec. 27, 1990, “Peralta, Luis Arcenio c. Estado Nacional,” Fallos
(1990-313-513) (Arg.). The Court made its argument for the survival of the nation
under the name of “securing national union,” a union that would vanish into thin air
if the country would blow into pieces as a result of the tremendous economic crisis.
Section 33 of the majority opinion reads: “It is of utmost importance the
preservation of the national union, understood in this case to be within the
framework of the promotion of the general welfare within reachable levels, such
that neither that union or this welfare can become illusory because of unsuitable
demands, nor be passively abandoned by the Powers called to preserve them
(emphases in the original).”
81. Art. 99, § 3, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (as amended
in 1994) (regulating so-called “decretos de necesidad y urgencia,” namely
executive orders in case of emergencies). Some legislative subject-matters, such as
taxation and criminal law, are excluded from those that the executive may take over
during emergencies.
82. See Santiago Legarre, Precedent in Argentine Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 781
(2011) (discussing the Bustos litigation of 2002).
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the police power).83 During the first third of the twentieth century, several
police power laws restricted property in new, more severe ways,
instantiating unprecedented forms of social and economic control by the
government, both state and federal. As we know, during the Lochner era,
the Supreme Court almost systematically invalidated these laws, effectively
denying room in the legal system for the ubi necessitas cessat ius
subprinciple.84 Probably, because the law of overruling necessity is inherent
to any reasonable legal system, the Court ended up overturning those
precedents and it did so for good, as explained in Section II above. From
the late 1930’s onwards the Court regularly upheld regulations in the
economic field, including applications of ubi necessitas cessat ius.85
CONCLUSION: THE EMERGING PANDEMIC AND THE RESURRECTION OF
THE POLICE POWER
The coronavirus crisis that unleashed itself on the world at the
beginning of 2020 provided for a new, unexpected opportunity for the
application of police measures. All around the world, rights in general
suffered from severe restrictions for the sake of public health. In particular,
and like in the old days, property rights have been sacrificed often times in
an attempt to preserve higher values. What matters now is to prevent an
excessive surprise in the eyes of the onlooker and to offer him or her
epistemological tools that will help the individual to have a clue.
Understanding the underpinnings of the police power and its articulation
with the law of overruling necessity might be a promising way of providing
such tool. It is my hope that this Symposium Article will have constituted a
modest contribution to the understanding of the present, rather chaotic,
status quo.

83. State laws, such as the ones dealt with by the Supreme Court in the first
decades of the twentieth century, during the Lochner era (for instance, minimum
wages and maximum hour laws, that arguably restricted property rights of the
employer), are forerunner examples of regulatory schemes preceding the great
depression – even though the content of the post-1930 regulations (mostly federal
in origin too) was radically different.
84. 3 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 809 (Baker, Voorhis and Company 2nd ed.1929).
85. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 489–92
(West Group 8th ed. 2010).

